Nacdi, dydi 5000 ddim yn iawn, i'r gwrthwyneb. Ond dydi o ddim yn fwy na 12000. Ta dwi'n methu rywbeth yn fama Newt?
Pwy sy'n sodio'r ffeithiau eto?
1.5 miliwn + o'r sancsyniau a'r rhyfeloedd, nid y rhyfel olaf.
"Yn gyntaf mae'r ffigwr o 1,000,000 yn gywir - profa fo'n wrong."
Mae Human Rights Watch yn deud 250,000. Profa
nhw'nanghywir. Profa dy filiwn di'n iawn.
Mae o yn eitha tedious i orfod ateb chdi a Ret mor aml. ond mae gadael i chi gael y gair olaf yn amhosib ei gyfiawnhau mewn cymdeithas war.
A mae cymryd gair rhaglenni newyddion yr imperialwyr anglo-sacsonaidd am 'mass graves' yn hanesyddol hynod naif. Mae'r tactec yma wedi ei ddefnyddio mor aml a mor gelwyddog mae'n amhosibl eu trystio, megis Fietnam a Cosofo i enwi dau.
O ia, mae'r mass graves yma yn cynnwys nifer o'r rhai a fradychwyd gan America pan geisiont godi yn erbyn Saddam yn 1991. Doedd America ddim yn siwr be fyddai eu polisi am olew'r wlad felly rhaid oedd eu rhwystro wrth gwrs. Helpwyd byddin Saddam gan America i'w lladd.
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/ ... 153149.asp
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE:
To understand the answer to this, Lewis says one must look at the events of 1991. "At the beginning of the Gulf War in that year, the U.S. government called on the people of Iraq to rise in rebellion and overthrow" Saddam, who "had oppressed them for so long." Iraqis "responded readily, and rebellions broke out in many parts of the country."
But in the meantime, concurrent with their victory, the U.S. agreed to a cease-fire with the defeated Iraqi leader. "In the days that followed, Saddam Hussein [crushed] the rebellion, [including] Shiites in the south and Kurds in the north, killing tens of thousands in the most brutal way, including with chemical weapons."
http://pilger.carlton.com/iraq/articles/55395
The US did not simply stand aside, and the uprising was treated with dismay by the US government. Much of the detail is in Said Aburish?s book cited earlier. During the bombing of Iraq in February 1991, Bush called for the Iraqi people to rise up against Saddam Hussein in 1991. What he wanted was a military coup, not a popular uprising, because it was expected that such an uprising in the centre and south of Iraq would be pro-Iranian and in favour of an Islamic state, and in the north would be in favour of Kurdish independence. Bush senior?s National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft said in 1997 ?we clearly would have preferred a coup. There?s no question about that.? (Interview on ABC news quoted in Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam I.B. Tauris 1999 p. 19). A popular uprising did take place in March 1991, and for the reasons given above, the US was willing to see it crushed: ?General Schwartzkopf, leading the coalition delegation [which met Iraqi commanders on 3 March], appeared to have little interest in the civil unrest engulfing southern Iraq. In fact he explicitly agreed, to the surprise of the Iraqi commanders, that Iraq could fly military helicopters ? but not fighters or bombers ? in areas where there were no coalition forces.
This effectively allowed Iraq to use helicopter gunships, along with artillery and ground forces, to crush the rebellions.? (Graham-Brown, p. 19). ?General Sir Peter de la Billiere, the commander of the British contingent in the Gulf War, has since been reported as saying that he felt Schwartzkopf was right to agree to the Iraqis flying helicopters. "The Iraqis were responsible for establishing law and order. You could not administer the country with using the helicopters." This suggests that the potential uses of the helicopters were well understood by the negotiators. Sir Peter further alleged that one of the battle objectives was to leave Iraq with enough forces "to defend its borders" against Iran?. (Washington Post 12 March 1998 quoted in Graham-Brown, p. 47).
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